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TORT LAW-TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS EXPECTANCY-A
TRAP FOR THE WARY AND UNWARY ALIKE
I. INTRODUCTION
Tortious interference with business expectancy, ambiguous and amor-
phous, has become a "trap for the wary and unwary alike."' Yet tort law
should be clear and provide adequate notice to would-be defendants. As
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted, "any legal standard must, in theo-
ry, be capable of being known" and if "a man has to pay damages, he is
supposed to have broken the law, and he is further supposed to have known
what the law was."2
Because tortious interference with business expectancy has developed
in a muddled manner,3 it is especially important that state courts continue to
refine this common-law tort. In Arkansas, however, tortious interference
has remained problematic over the last century even though it has been sta-
ble and unchanged over the last decade.4 Undoubtedly, there is great value
in stability in the law, but a common law tort should provide parties with
adequate notice and provide courts with well-defined law. Tortious interfer-
ence in Arkansas accomplishes neither, and it should be changed.
Tortious interference comes in two varieties-interference with con-
tract and interference with business expectancy. 5 Since their inception in
1853,6 courts have struggled to separate and apply these two distinct torts,
1. Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 789 n.3 (Utah 1994) (discussing a prior case
concerning tortious interference with business expectancy).
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 75 (A.B.A. 2009) (1881).
3. See Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectan-
cies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 61 (1982) (Perlman notes
that courts applying tortious interference with contract and interference with business expec-
tancy "have failed to develop common or consistent doctrines.").
4. The Arkansas Supreme Court first recognized tortious interference in Mahoney v.
Roberts, 86 Ark. 130, 110 S.W. 225 (1908); the court has not altered the rule since Mason v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 333 Ark. 3, 969 S.W.2d 160 (1998).
5. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 448-52 (2001). Although tortious interfer-
ence with contract and with business expectancy are the primary intentional tort doctrines
under which plaintiffs litigate within the larger body of interference torts, there are other
economic harm torts that constitute tortious interference, including interference with an inher-
itance or gift, interference with evidence in a civil suit, and negligent interference with con-
tract or economic interests. Id.
6. The first time a court recognized interference with contract as actionable-where the
interference was not independently tortious, such as with fraud or defamation-was in Lum-
ley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (K.B.) 752-53; 2 KL & BL 216, 224. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. b (1979).
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allowing them to evolve together in "an illogical and piecemeal fashion."7
Nevertheless, the basic form of tortious interference involves an established
contract or business expectancy between two parties, a third party who in-
tentionally interferes with their relationship, and, as a result, one party to the
original contract or expectancy who suffers an injury. 8 The primary differ-
ence between these two claims is that tortious interference with contract
requires third-party interference with an existing contract between parties,
whereas interference with business expectancy requires third-party interfer-
ence with a prospective contract between parties.9
The rationales for these two rules are slightly different. Broadly speak-
ing, courts have been concerned with balancing contract rights and competi-
tion-two essential ingredients in a free market economy. Because contract
rights deserve more protection than prospective contracts,1" the law requires
less third-party interference in contract cases 1 than in business expectancy
cases. 2 Another way of expressing this concept is to say that the law does
not protect the harmed party in prospective contract cases as much as it does
in existing contract cases. 3 When forming the rule for contract interference,
7. Lyn L. Stevens, Interference with Economic Relations-Some Aspects of the Turmoil
in the Intentional Torts, 12 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 595, 595 (1974).
8. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 445.
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. a.
10. Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 526-27, 446 S.W.2d. 543, 547 (1969) (The
court noted that tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with business
expectancy are different: Tortious interference with contract needs "greater protection"
whereas tortious interference with business expectancy only needs "some protection."); Walt
Bennett Ford, Inc., v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 274 Ark. 208, 214-A to 214-B, 624
S.W.2d 426, 429-30 (1981) (supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing) (Tortious interfer-
ence with contract and tortious interference with business expectancy are different, and "[t]he
chief difference lies in the recognition of more extensive privileges in the case of business
expectations."). See also Stebbins & Roberts, Inc. v. Halsey, 265 Ark. 903, 906-07, 582
S.W.2d 266, 267 (1979) (discussing the sanctity of existing contract relations).
11. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 526-27, 446 S.W.2d. 543, 547 (1969) (The difference
between interference with contract and interference with business expectancy involves the
"kind and amount of interference that is justifiable.").
12. Interference with prospective contract is commonly used interchangeably with inter-
ference with business expectancy. Arkansas uses "interference with business expectancy"
terminology. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 274 Ark. 208, 213-14, 624 S.W.2d 426, 429 (1981).
The Restatement, however, uses "interference with prospective contract" terminology.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B. Regardless of terminology, the tort requires "in-
tentional interference with prospective contractual relations, not yet reduced to contract." Id.
§ 766B cmt. a. Although this note uses the Arkansas terminology, interference with business
expectancy has other names, including interference with prospective economic advantage and
interference with prospective economic relations. See, e.g., Della Penna v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 741 (Cal. 1995).
13. See 2 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR., & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES
AND GRAY ON TORTS § 6.11 (3d ed. 2006) ("the law does not extend its protection as far in
the case of precontractual interferences as it does when existing contracts have been inter-
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courts placed greater emphasis on contract rights, and when forming the rule
for business expectancy interference, courts placed greater emphasis on
competition. 4
Tortious interference with contract in Arkansas certainly suffers from
many ailments, 15 but this note focuses on interference with business expec-
tancy and only discusses interference with contract as necessary.
This note argues that the rule for tortious interference in Arkansas
should be formally separated into two distinct rules-interference with con-
tract and interference with business expectancy-in order to help prevent
courts from intermingling terms and standards from both rules when ad-
dressing only one cause of action. This note also argues that the improper
element of tortious interference in Arkansas should be redefined as an un-
lawful act or an independent tort in order to provide a clear standard for
courts and to give adequate notice to would-be defendants.
In Part II, this note provides the historical development of tortious in-
terference law from its origin through its recent evolution in Arkansas. 16 In
Part 1H1, this note demonstrates the difficulty Arkansas courts have in apply-
ing the law due to the courts' intermingling interference with contract lan-
guage and interference with business expectancy language in cases involv-
ing only one cause of action. Part mH also demonstrates that the factors
courts currently use to determine whether an act was improper are both am-
biguous and unnecessary.
To resolve these two difficulties, this note proposes two changes in the
law.'7 First, the Arkansas Supreme Court should formally separate the cur-
rent single interference rule into two distinct rules-a tortious interference
with business expectancy rule and a tortious interference with contract
fered with" because the interest in contract cases is contractual security, whereas the interest
in prospective contract cases is a "reasonable expectation[ ] of economic advantage").
14. See id. The fact that courts recognize a privilege to compete in interference with
business expectancy cases, which is sufficient to justify a defendant's interference, demon-
strates that the law seeks to promote competition in expectancy cases; there is no recognized
privilege to compete in interference with contract cases. As Dobbs notes, "you are thus free
to induce my customers, employees, or suppliers to deal with you instead of me, as long [as]
they are not bound to me by contract." DOBBS, supra note 5, § 450; See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. a, b (1979).
15. The greatest criticism of tortious interference with contract involves how this area of
the law affects an efficient breach. See generally Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference
with Contract Versus "Efficient" Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 131, 132 (1999) ("[T]he interference tort penalizes, and may even nullify, the possibil-
ity of 'efficient breach' of contract, a fundamental construct described as "[o]ne of the most
enlightening insights of law and economics."').
16. Although the background section of this note is essential to understanding the pro-
posal, the background section was written with the additional purpose of aiding practitioners
who encounter tortious interference in litigation.
17. See infra Part Ill.
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rule-so that there is a clear distinction. 8 Second, the court should limit the
scope of and provide clarification for the improper element of tortious inter-
ference with business expectancy, and to this end, the court should redefine
improper as an unlawful act or independent tort.19
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE'S TORTIOUs HISTORY
A. The Early History of Tortious Interference with Business Expectancy
The famous case, Lumley v. Gye,2° is the starting point for any discus-
sion of tortious interference. Lumley, an 1853 tortious interference with con-
tract case from England, is significant because it stands for the novel propo-
sition that if two parties have a contract, and a third party induces one of
them to breach the contract, the interfering third party is liable for any re-
sulting damages--even though the means of inducement were neither illegal
nor independently tortious.2 The court based liability on Gye's intentional,
malicious interference with Lumley's contract rights.2
Forty years later, the English court extended Lumley to cases involving
interference with a prospective contract or potential business relationship.23
The court confirmed that the interference must be intentional and mali-
cious. 24 One year after England recognized tortious interference with busi-
ness expectancy, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized tortious
interference with contract, citing Lumley.25 Stating the rule, the Court held
that "if one maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties, and
induces one of them to break that contract to the injury of the other, the par-
ty injured can maintain an action against" the interfering party.26 In short
order, tortious interference spread throughout the states.
18. See infra Part III.A.2.
19. See infra Part Ill.B.2. An unlawful act is any act prohibited by statute, regulation, or
common law (assault, violating tax laws, etc.). An independent tort is any recognized tort
within a jurisdiction (defamation, outrage, etc.).
20. (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (K.B.) 752-53; 2 KL & BL 216, 224 (the first time tor-
tious interference was recognized in an English or American court).
21. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. b (1979).
22. Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 755; 2 KL & BL at 231.
23. Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 at 723 (Eng.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766B cmt. b.
24. Id. at 723 ("It is further submitted that it is clearly actionable to conspire maliciously
to prevent persons from contracting with a particular individual if actual damage is proved.").
25. Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 151 U.S. 1, 14 (1894).
26. Id. at 13.
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B. Arkansas's Contribution to Tortious Interference with Business
Expectancy
The Arkansas Supreme Court first recognized tortious interference-or
something akin to it-in 1908.27 Without offering a rationale or naming the
cause of action, the court held that this tort was an "actionable wrong" be-
cause the defendant induced the promisor to breach his contract "with the
intent to injure" the promisee.28 Arkansas recognized tortious interference,
citing Lumley and the adopting case from the Supreme Court of the United
States,29 which signaled that the essential elements were inducement (inten-
tional interference), a resulting breach, and malicious intent.
Tortious interference became a more permanent fixture in Arkansas
law in 1969 when the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the current rule and
provided a rationale.3" Because a party to a contract has a right to perfor-
mance by the other party and because those pursuing business opportunities
prior to forming a contract have reasonable expectancies of commercial rela-
tions,3' the court adopted the following rule:
The basic elements going into a prima facie establishment of the tort are
(1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectan-
cy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
interferor; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or
termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage
to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.32
The tort was founded on the premise that a person has a right to pursue
both contractual and business expectancies without another's "wrongful and
officious intermeddling. '3 3 The court stated that the interference must be
malicious but caused confusion regarding the malice requirement by not
27. Mahoney v. Roberts, 86 Ark. 130, 110 S.W. 225 (1908). The dispute in this case
involved a non-compete agreement between two parties, and one party, Mahoney, breached
the agreement by competing against Roberts, the other party to the agreement. Id. at 133, 110
S.W. at 226. Mahoney started a new company that did business under his stepson's name,
who, along with Mahoney's wife, pretended to operate the company. Id. at 133-34, 110 S.W.
at 226. The court held that Mahoney's wife and stepson, co-defendants with Mahoney, in-
duced Mahoney to violate his agreement with Roberts. Id. at 139, 110 S.W. at 228. Because
the record clearly established that Mahoney's wife merely aided Mahoney in establishing a
competing business, it seems strange that the court would hold she induced Mahoney to vio-
late the Roberts agreement. See id. at 138-39, 110 S.W. at 228.
28. Id. at 139, 110 S.W. at 228.
29. Id., 110 S.W. at 228.
30. Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 526-27, 446 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (1969).
31. Id., 446 S.W.2d at 546-47.
32. Id. at 527,446 S.W.2d at 547 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OFTORTS § 766 (1939)).
33. Id., 446 S.W.2d at 547.
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listing malice with the other elements.34 Of equal importance, the court
omitted a workable definition for malicious interference and failed to dis-
cuss whether the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant's
interference was malicious.
The malice requirement and burden of proof uncertainty were prob-
lematic until the Arkansas Supreme Court attempted to resolve these issues
in 1979. The court appeared to abandon the malice requirement as a method
of determining the interferor's intent, holding that "intentional interference
with the existing contractual relations of another is prima facie sufficient for
liability, and that the burden of proving that it is 'justified' rests upon the
defendant."35 Under this addition to the rule, the defendant had the burden of
proving the interference was justified or privileged, rather than the plaintiff
having to prove malice.36 Thus, instead of abandoning malicious intent alto-
gether, the court now presumed the intent was improper, wrongful, or unjus-
tified.
In 1992 the Arkansas Supreme Court reverted back to requiring that a
third party's actions must be malicious in order to constitute tortious inter-
ference,37 and the court affirmed this view again 1997.38 By 1998, there was
enough confusion regarding whether an interfering party's act had to be
malicious or improper39 that the Arkansas Supreme Court directly addressed
these conflicting elements of tortious interference.40 The court retained the
core elements it first adopted in 1969,n' and it also adopted two new re-
quirements.4 2 First, the court required the plaintiff to show that the defend-
ant's interference was improper.4 3 Second, the court defined improper using
34. See id. at 525-26, 446 S.W.2d at 546.
35. Stebbins & Roberts, Inc. v. Halsey, 265 Ark. 903, 906, 582 S.W. 2d 266, 267 (1979)
(quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OFTORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971)).
36. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 274 Ark. 208, 624
S.W.2d 426 (1981) (supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing) (confirming the rule and
holding that "[t]he general rule is that an improper motive or bad faith is no longer an essen-
tial part of the plaintiff's case in the tort of interference with existing contractual relations.
However, the defendant may show that his interference was privileged.").
37. United Bilt Homes v. Sampson, 310 Ark. 47, 51, 832 S.W.2d 502, 503 (1992).
38. Cross v. Ark. Livestock & Poultry Comm'n, 328 Ark. 255, 262, 943 S.W.2d 230,
234 (1997).
39. See Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450, 458-59, 844 S.W.2d 954, 959 (1993) (adopting
the "improper" element of tortious interference as defined in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 767 (1979), which conflicts with the requirement that the interference be malicious).
40. Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 333 Ark. 3, 7-14,969 S.W.2d 160, 162-65 (1998).
41. The core elements "are (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or busi-
ness expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor;
(3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or
expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been
disrupted." Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 527, 446 S.W.2d 543, 547 (1969).
42. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 333 Ark. at 10, 12-13, 969 S.W.2d at 163-65.
43. Id. at 14, 969 S.W.2d at 165.
[Vol. 34
TORT LAW
seven factors from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767. 44 The seven
factors are:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct; (b) the actor's motive; (c) the inter-
ests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes; (d) the inter-
ests sought to be advanced by the actor; (e) the social interests in protect-
ing the freedom of action of the actor and contractual interests of the
other; (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the inter-
ference; and (g) the relations between the parties.45
At this point, tortious interference had well-established elements, an
additional improper requirement, and seven factors to define improper, but
this tort remained problematic due to the ambiguous nature of the improper
factors and the difficulty the courts experienced in separating interference
with contract from interference with business expectancy.
C. Stagnation: Tortious Interference with Business Expectancy in the Last
Decade
Although many of the cases that contributed to the development of tor-
tious interference involved interference with contract, the last decade has
witnessed a handful of interference with business expectancy cases in the
Arkansas Supreme Court. These cases demonstrate three things. First, they
confirm the existing rule for tortious interference with business expectan-
cy,4 which is the same rule for interference with contract.47 Second, in cases
where the court found tortious interference, the interfering behavior was
either independently tortious or unlawful.48 This second observation is espe-
44. Id. at 12, 969 S.W.2d at 164.
45. Id., 969 S.W.2d at 164.
46. See e.g., Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. American Abstract & Title Co., 363 Ark. 530,
540, 215 S.W.3d 596, 601 (2005). In Stewart, the Arkansas Supreme Court applied the tor-
tious interference rule to a case where two affiliated title companies collaborated with other
real estate companies to establish control of the title services market through "sham transac-
tions" and "kickback schemes." Id. at 537, 215 S.W.3d at 599. The court acknowledged that
the Restatement's improper factors in § 767 are the tools it uses to determine improper inter-
ference, but then the court proceeded to discuss how the defendant's interference was im-
proper because the defendant violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1994). id. at 549-50, 215 S.W.3d at 607-08. Unlawful behavior,
the court implicitly held, is improper. Id. at 552, 215 S.W.3d at 609.
47. See, e.g., Knox v. Regions Bank, 103 Ark. App. 99, 105, 286 S.W.3d 737, 742
(2008) (listing the core elements of tortious interference as well as the improper element in an
interference with contract action).
48. See Stewart, 363 Ark. at 552, 215 S.W.3d at 609; Vowell v. Fairfield Bay Cmty.
Club, Inc., 346 Ark. 270, 277, 58 S.W.3d 324, 329 (2001). Vowell involved an investor inter-
fering with a property management company's expected revenue from a lot owner's deed
covenants and restrictions. Id. at 273-74, 58 S.W.3d at 326-27. Interestingly, the defendant
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cially relevant because it shows that the court's adoption and application of
the Restatement § 767 factors to define improper has not been helpful in
evaluating the plaintiff's tortious interference claim. In fact, outside of men-
tioning the factors, the court has not provided more than a few sentences of
analysis.49 Rather, the court has ignored the improper factors and has instead
held that independently tortious or unlawful conduct is improper.50 Third,
Arkansas recognizes the privilege to compete, which "will justify interfering
with another's business expectancy."'" The law carves out this privilege so
that competition will not be inhibited.52 For example, if there are two parties
who intend to engage in commercial activities, then a third-party competitor
may interfere without incurring liability.5 3 Citing a prior Arkansas Supreme
Court case, the Arkansas Court of Appeals confirmed the privilege to com-
pete rule:
(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a pro-
spective contract relation with another who is his competitor or not to
continue an existing contract terminable at will does not interfere im-
properly with the other's relation if (a) the relation concerns a matter in-
volved in the competition between the actor and the other and (b) the ac-
tor does not employ wrongful means and (c) his action does not create or
in Vowell engaged in a type of fraud, and this fraudulent behavior formed the basis for the
tortious interference claim. See id., 58 S.W.3d at 326-27. The property management group in
Vowell, the Club, should have sued under tortious interference with contract because the
dispute involved an agreement the lot owners made to pay dues to the Club when the owners
purchased land. Id. at 274, 58 S.W.3d at 327. The owners were required to pay dues until
Vowell interfered, purchased the lots for a nominal rate, and then transferred the deeds to an
offshore corporation in order to transfer liability away from himself and to frustrate the
Club's future collection efforts. Id. at 273-74, 58 S.W.3d at 326-27. Since tortious interfer-
ence with business expectancy by definition does not involve preexisting binding agreements,
such as the agreements of lot owners to pay dues to the Club, it is difficult to understand why
the trial court allowed a tortious interference with business expectancy claim in this contract
matter. Indeed, the supreme court even admits in the opinion that the claim alleged that
"Vowell tortiously interfered with [the Club's] business expectancy by terminating its con-
tractual relationships with nonresident property owners." Id. at 274, 58 S.W.3d at 327.
49. In Vowell, the court's application of the Restatement factors consisted of the follow-
ing: "Pursuant to the Restatement guidelines, we may also describe Vowell's conduct, mo-
tives, and interests, as 'improper."' 346 Ark. at 277, 58 S.W.3d at 329. Similarly, in Stewart,
the court thoroughly discussed the defendant's violations of federal law, but it only discussed
the Restatement factors by stating the defendant "engaged in improper conduct as described
in Vowell." 363 Ark. at 552, 215 S.W.3d at 609.
50. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
51. Office Machs., Inc. v. Mitchell, 95 Ark. App. 128, 130, 234 S.W.3d 906, 908
(2006).




continue an unlawful restraint of trade and (d) his purpose is at least in
part to advance his interest in competing with the other.
54
Even though the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768-the origin of
this rule-refers to the formulation above as the rule to determine whether
"competition [is] proper or improper interference,"55 Arkansas courts call it
the privilege to compete.56 According to the Restatement, this § 768 "com-
petition" rule should be used in lieu of the § 767 improper rule if the case
involves interference with business expectancy, and the interfering party is a
competitor of the plaintiff.57 Regardless of what a court calls the Restate-
ment rule in § 768, the object is to negate the improper element of tortious
interference with business expectancy.58
As of 2010,"9 the rule for tortious interference with business expectancy
in Arkansas consists of the core elements, 6° the improper element,6 and an
available privilege to compete.62
III. A PROPOSAL FOR CLARITY
The slow, incremental change of the common law provides stability in
the legal system, but it also frustrates reform efforts. The proposal below is
not a recommendation for sweeping changes in Arkansas's tortious interfer-
ence law; rather, the proposal consists of two changes that will improve
courts' application and potential litigants' understanding of the rule.
The Arkansas Supreme Court should change the law of tortious inter-
ference because Arkansas courts have difficulty applying the current law,
and it fails to provide people with notice that their behavior may subject
them to civil liability.63 These underlying principles--clarity for correct ju-
dicial application and proper notice of proscribed conduct-are foundational
in the American legal system. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United
States has weighed in on these principles, stating
54. Mitchell, 95 Ark. App. at 130, 234 S.W.3d at 908 (citing Kinco, Inc. v. Schueck
Steel, Inc., 283 Ark. 72, 78, 671 S.W.2d 178, 181-82 (1984)). In Kinco, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court quoted this rule from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 (1979).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1979).
56. See Mitchell, 95 Ark. App. at 130, 234 S.W.3d at 908.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. a, b.
58. See id.
59. See Crockett v. C.A.G. Inv., Inc., 2010 Ark. 90, at 9, __ SW.3d -, - (confirming
the core elements as well as the improper element of tortious interference with business ex-
pectancy and tortious interference with contract).
60. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 40, 43-45 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
63. See DOBBS, supra note 5, § 446 (arguing that judicial application of tortious interfer-
ence and its effects on litigants create a "judicial process" that is "dubious").
2012] 627
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Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportuni-
ty to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if ar-
bitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them.64
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stressed the importance of clarity in
tort law in order to provide proper notice of proscribed conduct, and he also
stated that it is the "business of the court" to clearly "formulate these stand-
ards" of tort liability.65
Ambiguous tort laws may not violate the Constitution,66 but they never-
theless violate fundamental principles of American jurisprudence. This sec-
tion provides a remedy for this "sorry state of affairs ' 67 by proposing that
Arkansas separate tortious interference with contract from tortious interfer-
ence with business expectancy and formulate a separate rule for each action.
This section further proposes that Arkansas redefine the improper interfer-
ence element of tortious interference with business expectancy as behavior
that is unlawful or independently tortious. Tortious interference with busi-
ness expectancy in Arkansas is unnecessarily ambiguous, and the courts can
and should remedy these defects.
A. Separation Anxiety: Two Different Claims Need Two Separate Rules
At first blush, a proposal to separate a rule because it contains two sep-
arate claims seems unnecessary. However, because tortious interference has
developed so haphazardly, it is a confusing area of law for lawyers and
64. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
65. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 75.
Finally, any legal standard must, in theory, be capable of being known. When a
man has to pay damages, he is supposed to have broken the law, and he is further
supposed to have known what the law was. If, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort
arise from failure to comply with fixed and uniform standards of external con-
duct, which every man is presumed and required to know, it is obvious that it
ought to be possible, sooner or later, to formulate these standards at least to some
extent, and that to do so must at last be the business of the court.
Id.
66. The Supreme Court only applies void for vagueness to free speech (Williams) and
criminal prosecution (Rogers). However, vague law is bad law even if it does not violate the
Constitution. U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S.
451,457 (2001).
67. Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L.
REV 335, 345 (1980).
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judges alike.68 Although the current rule in Arkansas covers both tortious
interference with contract and tortious interference with business expectan-
cy,69 the Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that these two causes of
action are distinct because contract relations deserve greater protection."
Distinctions notwithstanding, Arkansas courts sometimes confuse these two
claims when they apply the tortious interference rule. As the following cases
demonstrate, the courts intermingle contract and business expectancy lan-
guage in cases involving only one interference cause of action. Separating
the rule will bring much-needed clarity to a murky area of the law because
courts will be forced to use a specific rule for the appropriate cause of ac-
tion.
1. Cases: Misunderstanding, Misapplying, or Mistaking?
With a handful of exceptions,7 the Arkansas Supreme Court and the
Arkansas Court of Appeals have consistently used the same core elements in
tortious interference cases. 72 In Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County
68. See id.; DOBBS, supra note 5, § 446 ("In neither interference with contract nor inter-
ference with opportunity torts have courts been able to provide any concept of what counts as
wrongful or improper."); Stevens, supra note 7, at 595 (stating that tortious interference has
developed in an "illogical and piecemeal fashion").
69. Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 527, 446 S.W.2d 543, 547 (1969) (interference
with business expectancy); Knox v. Regions Bank, 103 Ark. App. 99, 105, 286 S.W.3d 737,
742 (2008) (interference with contract).
70. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
71. See generally Hayes v. Advanced Towing Servs., Inc., 73 Ark. App. 36, 40 S.W.3d.
800 (2001). In Hayes, the court decided a tortious interference case using the wrong rule for
tortious interference with contract. Id. at 39, 40 S.W.3d at 802. The Hayes court incorrectly
stated that in Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. the supreme court previously adopted the fol-
lowing rule:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a con-
tract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing
or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to li-
ability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of
the third person to perform the contract.
Id., 40 S.W.3d at 802. The Hayes court contended that the court had adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 766 (1979) in Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Id., 40 S.W.3d at 802. On
the contrary, this Restatement rule is significantly different from the tortious interference rule
Arkansas courts have used since 1969, and, thus, the court's statement was in error. The
supreme court only adopted the improper element from § 766 in Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. See 333 Ark. 3, 12-14, 969 S.W.2d 160, 164-165 (1998).
72. See infra section II.B. Arkansas courts have consistently used the original tortious
interference rule, which was established in 1969. Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 527,
446 S.W.2d 543, 547 (1969) (interference with business expectancy). See also Knox v. Re-
gions Bank, 103 Ark. App. 99, 105, 286 S.W.3d 737, 742 (2008) (interference with contract
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Special School District73 the Arkansas Supreme Court mixed the rules for
interference with business expectancy and contract in an action involving
only business expectancy.7 4 The court referred to the cause of action as "tor-
tious interference with business relations, 75 which, according to the rule,
could mean either interference with contractual relations or business expec-
tancy. The court appeared to clarify the discussion by stating the issue was
interference with "contractual rights," but then the court introduced the rule
as the law for interference with "valid contractual and business expectan-
cies."7 6 Although the rule does apply to both tortious interference actions,
this case did not involve contractual rights at all-as the court later clari-
fied.7 7 In a supplemental opinion, the Walt Bennett Ford court stated, "The
case at bar deals with interference with a business expectation and not an
existing contract., 78 In a single opinion, the court referred to a tortious inter-
ference with business expectancy issue as interference with 1) business rela-
tions; 2) contractual rights; 3) contractual and business expectancies; and 4)
business expectation.79 Since the only issue was tortious interference with
business expectancy, the only correct reference was the fourth one-
business expectation. The court combined terminology from both causes of
action in a case involving only one cause of action.
The courts again intermingled contract and business expectancy lan-
guage fifteen years after Walt Bennett Ford when the Arkansas Court of
Appeals decided another tortious interference with business expectancy
case, Office Machines, Inc. v. Mitchell.80 The Mitchell court referred to the
issue on appeal as "tortious interference" and began its analysis with "Ar-
kansas has recognized wrongful interference with a contract as an actionable
tort for nearly a century."'" Finally, the appellate court recited the tortious
interference rule and held that pursuant to the privilege to compete doctrine
the defendant's competition with the plaintiff justified his "interfering with
another's business expectancy. '' 82 In this case, the court used the terms tor-
tious interference, interference with contract, and interference with business
expectancy in a case solely concerning interference with business expectan-
action where the court confirmed the original tortious interference rule, but added the im-
proper element).
73. 274 Ark. 208, 624 S.W.2d 426 (1981).
74. See id. at210, 624 S.W.2d at427.
75. Id., 624 S.W.2d at 427.
76. Id. at 213, 624 S.W.2d at 429.
77. See id. at 214-A to 214-B, 624 S.W.2d at 429.
78. Id., 624 S.W.2d at 429.
79. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 274 Ark. at 210, 213, 624 S.W.2d at 427, 429.
80. 95 Ark. App. 128, 234 S.W.3d 906 (2006).
81. Id. at 129, 234 S.W.3d at 908.
82. Id., 234 S.W.3d at 908.
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cy.8 Again, even though there was only one cause of action-interference
with business expectancy-the court mixed in interference with contract
language.
The Arkansas Supreme Court mixed up the tortious interference ac-
tions when it decided an interference with contract case in 2007. El Paso
Production Co. v. Blanchard84 involved a claim that El Paso tortiously inter-
fered with a lease between Blanchard, the plaintiff-lessor, and Swift, the
lessee.85 In fact, the court concluded that since Swift did not breach his lease
with Blanchard, as required by the Arkansas rule, El Paso could not have
engaged in tortious interference.86 The problem here is that the court ex-
pressly stated that the case was about "a claim of tortious interference with
business expectancy," which is in direct conflict with the rest of the opinion
and the court's admission that the "point on appeal" 87 involved El Paso's
contention that it "did not tortiously interfere with the Swift lease. 88 The
court's intermingling of terms from both causes of action has led to more
confusion.
In Knox v. Regions Bank,89 a 2008 tortious interference with contract
case, the Arkansas Court of Appeals used the phrase "contractual expecta-
tions" before reciting the rule involving a "contractual relationship or a
business expectancy."90 Although the court later discusses tortious interfer-
ence with contract, the phrase "contractual expectations" is puzzling be-
cause the court seems to combine the two different causes of action into one
phrase. If the rule would have been separated, there would have been no
need to mention tortious interference with business expectancy in this inter-
ference with contract case.
The most recent example of Arkansas courts intermingling contract in-
terference language with business expectancy interference language is West
Memphis Adolescent Residential, LLC v. Compton,9' an appeallate court
case involving a relationship between a healthcare facility and a health ser-
vices provider. 92 The court provided headings for all four sections of the
opinion: Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Implied
83. Id., 234 S.W.3d at 908.
84. 371 Ark. 634, 269 S.W.3d 362 (2007).
85. Id. at 647, 269 S.W.3d at 373.
86. Id. at 648, 269 S.W.3d at 373-74. Tortious interference with contract requires that
the interfering party induce or cause a breach or termination of another's contractual relation-
ship. A valid contract and a breach of that contract are required. E.g., Mason v. Funderburk,
247 Ark. 521, 527,446 S.W.2d. 543, 547 (1969).
87. El Paso, 371 Ark. at 640, 269 S.W.3d at 368.
88. Id. at 647, 269 S.W.3d at 373.
89. 103 Ark. App. 99,286 S.W.3d 737 (2008).
90. Id. at 105, 286 S.W.3d at 741.
91. 2010 Ark. App. 450, __ S.W.3d ....
92. Id. at 2, S.W.3dat .
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Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Tortious Interference with
Contract.93 The court introduced the tortious interference with contract sec-
tion by acknowledging the state's recognition of "wrongful interference with
a contract," but then the court proceeded to discuss tortious interference
with "business expectancy., 94 The court concluded that the defendant's in-
terference was not improper because it was "privileged competition,"95 and
the competition privilege only applies to interference with business expec-
tancy.96 The court's intermingling the two causes of action makes it difficult
to understand how the court is applying the rules to the separate instances of
tortious interference-is the court discussing interference with contract,
interference with business expectancy, or both? Furthermore, the court's
incorrect use of language appears to have changed the outcome of this case.
As the cases above illustrate, Arkansas courts sometimes intermingle
the language of interference with contract with that of interference with
business expectancy-even when the court is only addressing one cause of
action. Not only is there a risk that the court will use the wrong elements97-
which could affect the outcome of the case-but a court's combining lan-
guage from two distinct causes of action causes confusion for lawyers and
other judges. Fortunately, there is an easy solution.
2. The Solution is a Simple Separation
Arkansas should normally separate tortious interference with contract
and interference with business expectancy into two separate rules because
they are two distinct claims. The problems discussed in the cases above
could be largely eliminated if courts will separate the interference torts into
separate rules and state the appropriate rule in judicial opinions. This will
assist Arkansas courts in applying the rule and using terms associated with
the appropriate claims. Such a change, while important, would be easy.
The difficulty that the Arkansas courts have in separating interference
with contract and interference with business expectancy is not unique. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts begins its chapter on tortious interference by
stating that tortious interference law is still in the "formative stage," and
courts do not often properly differentiate between interference with contract
93. Id. at 5-9, - S.W.3d at.
94. Id. at 9-12, _ S.W.3d at .
95. Id. at 11-12, S.W.3d at .
96. See discussion supra Part I.C.
97. Tortious interference with contract requires a contract and a breach. There is no
privilege to compete defense for this tort. Tortious interference with business expectancy
involves a prospective contract and the privilege to compete defense (or negation of improper
interference) is available for this tort. Thus, applying the wrong elements could certainly alter
the outcome of a tortious interference case. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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and interference with business expectancy.98 In a highly influential tortious
interference opinion, the California Supreme Court stated that it must draw a
"sharpened distinction" between the two interference torts.99 Additionally,
the Texas Supreme Court noted that erroneous judicial association of these
two interference torts and confusion regarding their distinct standards of
liability are persistent problems when it changed the state's tortious interfer-
ence with business expectancy rule in 200 1. "
To mitigate judicial confusion over tortious interference in Arkansas,
this note proposes separating the current tortious interference rule into the
following separate rules:
Tortious interference with contract requires
(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the
contract; (3) intentional interference by the defendant that induces or
causes a breach or termination of the contract; (4) resultant damage to
the party whose contract has been disrupted; and (5) improper conduct
on the part of the defendant as defined by the following factors: (a) the
nature of the actor's conduct; (b) the actor's motive; (c) the interests of
the other with which the actor's conduct interferes; (d) the interests
sought to be advanced by the actor; (e) the social interests in protecting
the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the oth-
er; (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interfer-
ence; and (g) the relations between the parties.
Tortious interference with business expectancy requires
(1) the existence of a valid business expectancy; (2) the defendant's
knowledge of the expectancy; (3) intentional interference by the defend-
ant that causes a termination of the expectancy; (4) resultant damage to
the party whose expectancy has been disrupted; and (5) improper con-
duct on the part of the defendant, which is defined as conduct that is un-
lawful or independently tortious.
As this note's discussion of Arkansas courts' confusion concerning in-
terference torts illustrates, 10 the courts need to provide clarity to this already
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 37, intro, note (1979). "First, the law in this
area has not fully congealed but is still in a formative stage. The several forms of the tort set
forth in §§ 766 to 766B are often not distinguished by the courts ..... Id. In the Second
Restatement, interference with contract and prospective contracts are two distinct rules under
§ 766 and § 766B respectively.
99. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 750 (Cal. 1995)
(emphasizing "the need [for courts] to draw and enforce a sharpened distinction between
claims for the tortious disruption of an existing contract and claims that a prospective contrac-
tual or economic relationship has been interfered with by the defendant.").
100. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex. 2001).
101. See discussion supra III.A.2.
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murky area of the law by establishing a distinct rule for each cause of action.
Separating the current rule, this note proposes, is part of the solution.
B. Properly Defining Improper: A New Definition
Since the Arkansas Supreme Court formally adopted the improper el-
ement and defined it with factors from the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
10 2
the new element's definition has been marginally useful at best and hope-
lessly ambiguous at worst. Tort scholars agree that the Restatement § 767
factors lack clarity for determining when behavior becomes improper,0 3
cause judicial unfairness because they are vague and indeterminate,'O' and
fail to improve or edify tortious interference law.0 5
Clearly and appropriately defining improper behavior is important for
two reasons. First, although the courts must sometimes address the other
elements of tortious interference with business expectancy, the majority of
interference cases turn on whether the interference was improper. 10 6 Second,
Arkansas's use of § 767 to define improper conduct in tortious interference
cases "fails to notify defendants whether their conduct is improper."'0 7 Be-
cause improving the quality of notice that defendants receive is a primary
goal of tort law,"°8 Arkansas should redefine the improper element of inter-
ference with business expectancy.
As the interference with business expectancy cases below demonstrate,
the Arkansas Supreme Court cited the improper factors without providing
analysis and instead used independently tortious or unlawful conduct to de-
termine if interference was improper. Further, as the proposal below argues,
if the court formally defines improper as an act that is either an independent
tort or unlawful act, the definition will better represent case law and give
adequate notice to would-be defendants.
102. Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 333 Ark. 3, 12-14, 969 S.W.2d 160, 164-65
(1998).
103. Alex. B. Long, The Business of Law and Tortious Interference, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J.
925, 932 (2005) (Discussing the factors in § 767, Professor Long states "One of the chief
criticisms of tortious interference claims is the lack of clarity concerning when an interfer-
ence becomes 'improper."').
104. Dobbs, supra note 67, at 346 (discussing problems with judicial fairness because
factors are vague and indeterminate).
105. Perlman, supra note 3, at 67-68.
106. Long, supra note 103, at 931.
107. See Eric P. Voigt, Driving Through the Dense Fog: Analysis of and Proposed
Changes to Ohio Tortious Interference Law, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 362 (2007).
108. Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 823 (1983) ("Improving the quality of notice given to defendants is one
of the goals toward which a civilized law of torts should strive.").
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1. Is Arkansas Improperly Using Improper?
In 1998, when the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the Second Re-
statement's improper element from § 766 and defined the term using § 767,
there was no Arkansas case law applying these rules for the court to consid-
er.' 9 Since 1998, however, a number of tortious interference with business
expectancy cases have come before the court. In all of these cases where the
plaintiff recovered damages, there were two important features in the court's
opinions. First, the court recited the Second Restatement's § 767 factors
without applying them. Second, the interfering behavior in these cases was
either independently tortious or unlawful.
When the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the improper element and
its defining factors for tortious interference, the case before the court only
involved interference with contract. 1 ° Three years later, in 2001, the court
first applied the improper element to a business expectancy case where the
defendant's interfering acts were both independently tortious and unlaw-
ful."' In Vowell v. Fairfield Bay Community Club, Inc., 112 the defendant,
Vowell, engaged in a fraudulent "scheme" to deprive a property manage-
ment organization, Fairfield Bay, of property owner dues." 3 Vowell also
attempted to force Fairfield Bay to accept unilateral transfers of forty-nine
deeds of property without Fairfield's consent, which would have resulted in
a loss of owner dues."4 Lastly, Vowell transferred 221 other deeds to an
offshore corporation "in a thinly veiled attempt to thwart the chancery
court's ... order.""..5 Here, Vowell engaged in fraudulent behavior consist-
ing of invalid and forced property transfers and actions designed to thwart a
court order. These acts are both independently tortious and unlawful. It is no
surprise that the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's deter-
mination that Vowell tortiously interfered with Fairfield Bay's business ex-
pectancy. 116 When the court discussed applying the factors that define im-
proper, however, it simply stated that "[p]ursuant to the Restatement guide-
lines, we may also describe Vowell's conduct, motives, and interests, as
109. See Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 333 Ark. 3, 12-14, 969 S.W.2d 160, 164-65
(1998). Prior to adopting the improper element and placing the burden on the plaintiff in this
case, Arkansas courts had no prior experience with either applying improper or the § 767
factors.
110. Id. at 6-7, 969 S.W.2d at 161-62.
111. Vowell v. Fairfield Bay Cmty. Club, Inc., 346 Ark. 270, 273-74, 58 S.W.3d 324,
326-27 (2001).
112. 346 Ark. 270, 58 S.W.3d 324 (2001).
113. Id. at 274, 58 S.W.3d at 327.
114. Id., 58 S.W.3d at 327.
115. Id. at 276, 58 S.W.3d at 328.
116. Id. at 277, 58 S.W.3d at 329.
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'improper."'1 7 The court did not actually apply the improper factors or offer
any guidance as to their application.
The Arkansas Supreme Court once again addressed interference with
business expectancy in a 2005 case involving a defendant who engaged in
illegal conduct, and the court once again failed to apply or offer any guid-
ance in applying the improper factors." 8 In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v.
American Abstract & Title Co.,' the plaintiff, American Abstract, stated in
its complaint that the defendant engaged in illegal conduct, which was suffi-
cient "evidence of impropriety [or improper interference] .,,120 The court
found that the defendant, Stewart, violated the Real Estate Settlement Pro-
cedures Act (RESPA), and the court held the jury was therefore justified in
finding that Stewart "engaged in improper conduct."' 12' Although the court
began its analysis of whether Stewart's conduct was improper by listing the
seven improper factors, 122 the court never applied them, but it instead dis-
cussed Stewart's violation of RESPA at length.123 In sum, the defendant's
interfering behavior was unlawful, and unlawful behavior is improper.
24
In the most recent tortious interference with business expectancy case,
the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the defendant's illegal conduct con-
stituted improper interference, and again, the court listed the improper fac-
tors without providing analysis or guidance. 21 In Baptist Health v. Mur-
phy, "'26 the court affirmed the lower court's finding that "Baptist's conduct
constituted a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and
that such violation can satisfy the impropriety requirement for a claim of
tortious interference [with business expectancy] .,'27 As with earlier tortious
interference cases where the defendant's improper behavior was at issue, the
Arkansas Supreme Court began its analysis by listing the improper factors,
but it never applied them and instead discussed Baptist's unlawful con-
duct."'28
There was little reason for Arkansas to adopt the Restatement's § 767
improper factors prior to 1998, and there remains little reason to continue
using the factors because case law clearly indicates that the Arkansas Su-
117. Id.,58S.W.2dat324.
118. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. American Abstract & Title Co., 363 Ark. 530, 548-50,
215 S.W.3d 596, 607-08 (2005).
119. 363 Ark. 530, 215 S.W.3d 596 (2005).
120. Id. at 544, 215 S.W.3d at 604.
121. Id. at 552, 215 S.W.3d at 609.
122. Id. at 550, 215 S.W.3d at 607.
123. Id. at 550-53, 215 S.W.3d at 607-09.
124. Id. at 552, 215 S.W.3d at 609.
125. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark. 115, 125, 226 S.W.3d 800, 809 (2006).
126. 365 Ark. 115, 226 S.W.3d 800 (2006).
127. Id. at 129, 226 S.W.3d at 811.
128. Id. at 125-29, 226 S.W.3d at 809-11.
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preme Court focuses on independently tortious or unlawful conduct to de-
termine whether a defendant's interference with business expectancy was
improper.
2. The Solution is Redefinition
The fact that the Arkansas high court has not used the factors in § 767
to determine if a defendant's conduct was improper in any tortious interfer-
ence with business expectancy cases since the factors were adopted in 1998
raises the question: What do the improper factors accomplish? The answer
is that the factors' lack of clarity results in would-be defendants having in-
adequate notice that their behavior-which may be purely competitive-
may subject them to civil liability. 129 Likewise, a plaintiff does not benefit
from the ambiguity because he will be uncertain about strength of the claim.
These factors 3 based on subjective considerations-the actor's mo-
tive, interests, and society's interests, etc-are abstract and vague.' 3 ' Apply-
ing these vague and abstract rules causes unpredictability and an unfair judi-
cial process because their application "cannot describe the wrongful acts"
that are prohibited. 3 2 Arkansas should abandon the improper factors and
adopt a clear standard.
33
At the national level, the law of tortious interference with prospective
contract or business expectancy is moving away from the Restatement § 767
factors. For example, only thirteen states still use the Restatement factors to
define improper conduct. 134 Thirty-seven states have declined to use the Re-
129. Voigt, supra note 107, at 362.
130. Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 333 Ark. 3, 12, 14, 969 S.W.2d 160, 164-65 (1998)
("our law requires that the conduct of the defendant be at least 'improper,"' which is deter-
mined by applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767: (a) the nature of the actor's
conduct; (b) the actor's motive; (c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes; (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor; (e) the social interests in pro-
tecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other; (f) the
proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference; and (g) the relations be-
tween the parties).
131. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 446 ("[These] factors are so abstract that they might apply to
almost any decision in torts. The result is that the rules are vague and indeterminate.").
132. Id.
133. This note argues that improper should be redefined for tortious interference with
business expectancy. The vagueness arguments in this subsection also apply to the improper
element in tortious interference with contract-to a lesser degree. However, interference with
contract arguments are outside of the scope of this note.
134. Havensure, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 595 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2010) (apply-
ing Ohio law); White Sands Grp., LLC v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 2009); Safeway Ins.
Co., v. Guerrero, 106 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. 2005); Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 333 Ark. 3,
969 S.W.2d 160 (1998); BECO Const. Co., v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 184 P.3d 844 (Idaho 2008);
Dillon v. Ruperto, 786 N.W.2d 873 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010); United Truck Leasing Corp. v.
Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1990); Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 534 A.2d 706 (N.H.
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statement factors, and of those thirty-seven states, twenty-two require inter-
ference to be wrongful, malicious, unjustified, unprivileged, or improper as
defined by state case law. 3 These twenty-two states have chosen the lesser
of two evils, preferring inconsistent case law definitions over the Restate-
ment factors. The remaining fifteen states require the interference to be an
independent tort or an unlawful act.'36
The fact that less than half of the states still use the Restatement factors
is a persuasive reason for Arkansas to change its rule because this signals
that the law in this area is moving away from § 767. However, a more per-
suasive reason to redefine improper in Arkansas to mean an independent tort
or unlawful conduct lies in a number of other state supreme court decisions
where the court recently rejected or abandoned the improper factors and
adopted an independent tort or unlawful act standard. The two most im-
portant cases are discussed below, and in accordance with scholarship in this
1987); Wilspec Techs., Inc. v. DunAn Holding Grp., Co., 204 P.3d 69 (Okla. 2009); Skiff re
Business, Inc. v. Buckingham Ridgeview, LP, 991 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); Avilla v.
Newport Grand Jai Alai, LLC, 935 A.2d 91 (R.I. 2007); Dykstra v. Page Holding Co., 766
N.W.2d 491 (S.D. 2009); Carlson v. Carlson, 775 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 1989).
135. J & S Servs., Inc. v. Tomter, 139 P.3d 544 (Alaska 2006); Marquez v. PanAmerican
Bank, 943 So. 2d 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Tom's Amusement Co., Inc. v. Total Vend-
ing Servs., 533 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 957 P.2d 1076
(Haw. Ct. App. 1998); Romanek v. Connelly, 753 N.E.2d 1062 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Byers v.
Snyder, 237 P.3d 1258 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010); Thompson v. Sysco Louisville Food Servs. Co.,
No. 2006-CA-001848-MR, 2008 WL 2065238 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Polar Bear Ice Co. v.
Williamson, 883 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Mino v. Clio Sch. Dist., 661 N.W.2d 586
(Mich. 2003); PDN, Inc. v. Loring, 843 So. 2d 685 (Miss. 2003); Hardy v. Vision Serv. Plan,
120 P.3d 402 (Mont. 2005); The Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Fremont, 771 N.W.2d 894 (Neb.
2009); Crockett v. Sahara Realty Corp., 591 P.2d 1135 (Nev. 1979); Lamorte Burns & Co., v.
Walters, 770 A.2d 1158 (N.J. 2001); Ettenson v. Burke, 17 P.3d 440 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000);
MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of Southern Pines, 702 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Straube v.
Larson, 600 P.2d 371 (Or. 1979); Santoro v. Schulthess, 681 S.E.2d 897 (S.C. Ct. App.
2009); Gifford v. Sun Data, Inc., 686 A.2d 472 (Vt. 1996); Pleas v. City of Seattle, 774 P.2d
1158 (Wash. 1989); Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va.
1998); Stapel v. Stapel, 789 N.W.2d 753 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
136. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995); Harris
Grp., Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188 (Colo. App. 2009); Biro v. Hirsch, 771 A.2d 129
(Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Boyce Thompson Inst. v. MedImmune, Inc., No. 07C-11-217 JRS,
2009 WL 1482237 (Del. Super. Ct. 2009); Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000); Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 915 A.2d 400 (Me. 2007); Berry & Gould, P.A. v. Berry,
757 A.2d 108 (Md. 2000); Harman v. Heartland Food Co., 614 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000); Hair Say, Ltd. v. Salon Opus, Inc., 800 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Trade'n
Post, LLC. v. World Duty Free Americas, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 2001); Trau-Med of
Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 2002); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges,
52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001); Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah
2008); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ranson Tyler Chevrolet, LLC, No. CL05000199-00, 2007
WL 6013146 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007).
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field, 137 these decisions together "requiring independent tortious conduct as
the measure of wrong doing mark[ ] a new direction."138
a. California's measure: Interference must be wrongful by some
legal measure
In 1995, the California Supreme Court held that interference with pro-
spective contractual relations requires the interfering conduct to be "wrong-
ful by some legal measure."'' 39 This change in the law was necessary, the
court noted, for two reasons."4 First, the court reasoned that interference
with business expectancy should be differentiated from interference with
contract in terms of the potential for tort liability because "ours is a culture
firmly wedded to the social rewards of commercial contests, [and thus] the
law usually takes care to draw lines of legal liability in a way that maximiz-
es areas of competition free of legal penalties."'' Second, the court ob-
served that evaluating improper or wrongful behavior in the same manner
for interference with business expectancy and interference with contract
"blurs the analytical line" between the two and "invites both uncertainty in
conduct and unpredictability of its legal effect."'' 42 In essence, courts should
not use the same standard for evaluating wrongful or improper interference
with contract as it does with business expectancy because contract rights
deserve greater protection than prospective contract relations.
The standard to evaluate wrongful or improper interference with busi-
ness expectancy must be a legal measure because in non-contractual rela-
tions the "rewards and risks of competition are dominant."' 43 A standard less
than a legally measureable standard-violation of a statute or common law
tort-for determining wrongful or improper interference fails to give notice
that one's conduct may have an adverse "legal effect" on him.' 44 Evaluating
interfering conduct using a legal measure instead of factors or standards that
invite uncertainty provides clarity for the court and potential defendants.
137. Perlman, supra note 3, at 97 (This "interference tort should be limited to cases in
which the defendant's acts are independently unlawful."); See Dobbs, supra note 67, at 365
("The most obvious case for imposing liability for interference is the case in which the de-
fendant commits acts which constitute a tort, independent of the interference analysis .....
138. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 446 (Supp. 2010).
139. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 751 (Cal. 1995).







b. Texas clarity: Interference must be independently tortious or
unlawful
In 2001 the Supreme Court of Texas began its opinion in an interfer-
ence with business expectancy case by stating "This case affords us the op-
portunity to bring a measure of clarity to this body of law." '45 The court then
proceeded to require "that to establish liability for interference with a pro-
spective contractual or business relation the plaintiff must prove that it was
harmed by the defendant's conduct that was either independently tortious or
unlawful. 146 Lest anyone misunderstand what the court meant by the new
independently tortious interference requirement, the court unequivocally
stated, "we mean conduct that would violate some other recognized tort
duty."'
147
Grounding liability in tortious interference with business expectancy in
"conduct that is independently tortious by nature or otherwise unlawful," '
the court offered two reasons for changing the rule. First, the court criticized
the improper requirement and its associated factors for interference with
contract and prospective contract in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, writ-
ing that the Restatement overstated case law.'49 Second, the Texas Supreme
Court wrote that a requirement that interference must be either an independ-
ent tort or otherwise unlawful is necessary because "no other workable basis
exists for distinguishing between tortious interference and lawful competi-
tion.,"50
Here, the court was concerned with accurately following the recent de-
velopments in the law of tortious interference with business expectancy.' 5'
But, the court was also focused on creating a standard for evaluating wrong-
ful or improper conduct that was 1) more difficult to meet than the standard
used for interference with contract, since contract cases involve preexisting
contract entitlements but interference with prospective contract cases in-
volve no such entitlements; 52 and 2) clearly wrongful or improper to the
defendant and jury, and existing independent torts or unlawful acts are both
established and known. 5 3 In short, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that
an established standard of wrongful conduct-a tort or other illegal act-is a
far better standard for juries and would-be defendants to apply.
145. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. 2001).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 721.
149. Id. at 720.
150. Id. at 721.
151. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 725 (Tex. 2001).
152. Id. at 727.
153. See id. at 726.
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The Texas and California supreme courts both recently required that a
defendant's conduct must be either an independent tort or an unlawful act
because this requirement creates a clear distinction between the type of con-
duct that is improper for interference with contract versus interference with
business expectancy. Further, this requirement provides notice to defendants
that their behavior may subject them to tort liability. Arkansas would realize
an additional benefit by redefining improper as well. If there are no § 767
factors, then there is no need for the privilege to compete in § 768-lawful
competition would be safe and competitors would be able to distinguish
between the types of interference the law allows and those that it prohibits.
TV. CONCLUSION
Judges, juries, defendants, and would-be defendants would greatly
benefit from the important changes to tortious interference law proposed in
this note. Courts unquestionably confuse interference with contract and in-
terference with business expectancy, and, thus, the current rule should be
separated into distinct claims, Furthermore, there is no doubt that the current
improper element's definitional factors are unnecessary and abstract, and,
thus, defining improper as an independent tort or unlawful act would be in
accord with case law and would provide adequate notice to would-be de-
fendants. Tortious interference law in Arkansas needs to change.
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